Abstract. The standard reasoning problem, concept satisfiability, in the basic description logic ALC is PSPACE-complete, and it is EXPTIMEcomplete in the presence of unrestricted axioms. Several fragments of ALC, notably logics in the FL, EL, and DL-Lite families, have an easier satisfiability problem; sometimes it is even tractable. All these fragments restrict the use of Boolean operators in one way or another. We look at systematic and more general restrictions of the Boolean operators and establish the complexity of the concept satisfiability problem in the presence of axioms. We separate tractable from intractable cases.
Introduction
Standard reasoning problems of description logics, such as satisfiability or subsumption, have been studied extensively. Depending on the expressivity of the logic and the reasoning problem, the complexity of reasoning for DLs ranging from logics below the basic description logic ALC to the OWL DL standard SROIQ is between tractable and NEXPTIME.
For ALC, concept satisfiability is PSPACE-complete [26] and, in the presence of unrestricted axioms, it is EXPTIME-complete due to the correspondence with propositional dynamic logic [24, 28, 14] . Since the standard reasoning tasks are interreducible in the presence of all Boolean operators, subsumption has the same complexity.
Several fragments of ALC, such as logics in the FL, EL or DL-Lite families, are well-understood. They often restrict the use of Boolean operators, and it is known that their reasoning problems are often easier than for ALC. For instance, concept subsumption with respect to acyclic and cyclic TBoxes, and even with GCIs is tractable in the logic EL, which allows only conjunctions and existential restrictions, [4, 9] , and it remains tractable under a variety of extensions such as nominals, concrete domains, role chain inclusions, and domain and range restrictions [5, 6] . However, the presence of universal quantifiers breaks tractability: Subsumption in FL 0 , which allows only conjunction and universal restrictions, is coNP-complete [21] and increases to PSPACE-complete with respect to cyclic TBoxes [3, 18] and to EXPTIME-complete with GCIs [5, 17] . In [12, 13] , concept satisfiability and subsumption for several logics below and above ALC that extend FL 0 with disjunction, negation and existential restrictions and the standard reductions use Boolean operators that are not available in every fragment.
Preliminaries
Description Logic. We use the standard syntax and semantics of ALC with the Boolean operators , , ¬, , ⊥ replaced by arbitrary operators o that correspond to Boolean functions f o of arbitrary arity. Let N C , N R and N I be sets of atomic concepts, roles and individuals. Then the set of concept descriptions, for short concepts, is defined by C := A | o(C, . . . , C) | ∃R.C | ∀R.C, where A ∈ N C , R ∈ N R , and o is a Boolean operator. A general concept inclusion (GCI) is an axiom of the form C D where C, D are concepts. We use "C ≡ D" as the usual syntactic sugar for "C D and D C". A TBox is a finite set of GCIs without restrictions. An ABox is a finite set of axioms of the form C(x) or R(x, y), where C is a concept, R ∈ N R and x, y ∈ N I . An ontology is the union of a TBox and an ABox. This simplified view suffices for our purposes.
An interpretation is a pair I = (∆ I , · I ), where ∆ I is a nonempty set and · I is a mapping from N C to P(∆ I ), from N R to P(∆ I × ∆ I ) and from N I to ∆ I that is extended to arbitrary concepts as follows:
I . An interpretation I satisfies a TBox (ABox, ontology) if it satisfies every axiom therein. It is then called a model of this set of axioms.
Let B be a finite set of Boolean operators and use Con(B) and Ax(B) to denote the set of all concepts and axioms using only operators in B. The following decision problems are of interest for this paper.
Concept satisfiability CSAT(B):
Given a concept C ∈ Con(B), is there an interpretation I s.t.
TBox satisfiability TSAT(B): Given a TBox T ⊆ Ax(B), is there an interpretation I s.t. I |= T ?
TBox-concept satisfiability TCSAT(B): Given T ⊆ Ax(B) and C ∈ Con(B), is there an I s.t. I |= T and C I = ∅ ?
Ontology satisfiability OSAT(B): Given an ontology O ⊆ Ax(B), is there an interpretation I s.t. I |= O ?
Ontology-concept satisfiability OCSAT(B): Given O ⊆ Ax(B) and C ∈ Con(B), is there an I s.t. I |= O and C I = ∅ ?
These problems are interreducible independently of B in the following way:
The reasons are: a concept C is satisfiable iff the ontology {a : C} is satisfiable, for some individual a; a terminology T is satisfiable iff a fresh atomic concept A is satisfiable w.r.t. T ; C is satisfiable w.r.t. T iff T ∪ {a : C} is satisfiable, for a fresh individual a.
Complexity Theory. We assume familiarity with the standard notions of complexity theory as, e. g., defined in [22] . In particular, we will make use of the classes P, NP, coNP, PSPACE, and EXPTIME, as well as logspace reductions ≤ log m .
Boolean operators. This study aims at being complete with respect to Boolean operators, which correspond to Boolean functions. A set of Boolean functions is called a clone if it is closed under superpositions of functions, i.e., nesting of operators. The lattice of all clones has been established in [23] , see [8] for a more succinct but complete presentation. Via the inclusion structure, lower and upper complexity bounds carry over to higher and lower clones. We will therefore only state our results for minimal and maximal clones.
Given a finite set B of functions, the smallest clone containing B is denoted by [B] . 
The symbol ⊕ denotes the binary exclusive or. The following lemma will help restrict the length of concepts in some of our reductions. It shows that for certain sets B, there are always short concepts representing the functions ∧, ∨, or ¬, respectively. Points (2) and (3) follow directly from the proofs in [19] , Point (1) is Lemma 1.4.5 from [27] .
Lemma 1. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions.
⊆ M, resp.), then there exists a B-formula f (x, y) such that f represents x ∨ y (x ∧ y, resp.) and each of the variables x and y occurs exactly once in f (x, y).
If
[B] = BF, then there are B-formulae f (x, y) and g(x, y) such that f represents x ∨ y, g represents x ∧ y, and both variables occur in each of these formulae exactly once.
, then there is a B-formula f (x) such that f represents ¬x and the variable x occurs in f only once.
Auxiliary results. The following lemmata contain technical results that will be useful to formulate our main results. We use SAT(B) to speak about any of the four satisfiability problems TSAT, TCSAT, OSAT and OCSAT introduced above.
Lemma 2. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. If
Proof. It is easy to observe that the concepts and ⊥ can be simulated by fresh atomic concepts T and B, using the axioms ¬T T and B ¬B. Proof. It can be easily shown that C, T ∈ TCSAT(B) iff T ∪ { ∃R.C} ∈ TSAT(B ∪ { }), where R is a fresh relational symbol. For "⇒" observe that for the satisfying interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ) there must be a world w where C holds and then from every world w ∈ ∆ I there can be an R-edge from w to w to satisfy T ∪ { ∃R.C}. For "⇐" note that for a satisfying interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ) all axioms in T ∪ { ∃R.C} are satisfied. In particular the axiom ∃R.C. Hence there must be at least one world w s.t. w |= C. Thus I |= T and
Furthermore, we observe that, for each set B of Boolean functions with , ⊥ ∈ [B], we can simulate the negation of an atomic concept using a fresh atomic concept A and role R A : if we add the axioms A ≡ ∃R A . and A ≡ ∀R A .⊥ to the given terminology T , then each model of T has to interpret A as the complement of A.
Complexity results for CSAT
The following classification of concept satisfiability has been obtained in [16] .
Theorem 4 ([16]
). Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions.
Part (1) is in contrast with the coNP-completeness of ALU satisfiability [26] because the operators in ALU can express the canonical base of S 11 . The difference is caused by the fact that ALU allows only unqualified existential restrictions. Part (2) generalises the coNP-completeness of ALE satisfiability, where hardness is proven in [12] without using atomic negation. It is in contrast with the tractability of AL satisfiability [13] , again because of the unqualified restrictions. Part (3) generalises the known fact that every EL, FL 0 , and FL − concept is satisfiable. The results for logics in the DL-Lite family cannot be put into this context because DL-Lite quantifiers are unqualified.
Complexity Results for TSAT, TCSAT, OSAT, OCSAT
In this section we will completely classify the above mentioned satisfiability problems for their tractability with respect to sub-Boolean fragments and put them into context with existing results for fragments of ALC.
Main results. Due to the interreducibilities stated in Section 2, it suffices to show lower bounds for TSAT and upper bounds for OCSAT.
Theorem 5. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Proof. Parts 1.-6. are formulated as Lemmas 11, 12, 13, 9, 10, 14, and are proven below. The second part of (1.) follows from Lemma 11 in combination with Lemma 3.
In order to generalize these results, we need to prove the following lemma. It states the base independence that will lead to the more general results in Corollary 7 and Corollary 8. Proof. According to [16, Theorem 3 .6], we translate for any given instance each Boolean formula (hence each side of an axiom) into a Boolean circuit over the basis B 1 . This circuit can be easily transformed into a circuit over the basis B 2 . This new circuit will be expressed by several new axioms that are constructed in the style of the formulae in [16] :
-For input gates g, we add the axiom g ≡ x i .
-If g is a gate computing the Boolean function φ and h 1 , . . . , h n are the respective predecessor gates in this circuit, we add the axiom g ≡ φ(h 1 , . . . , h n ). -For ∃R-gates g, we add the axiom g ≡ ∃R.h.
-Analogously for ∀R-gates. This reduction is computable in logarithmic space and its correctness can be shown in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.6 in [16] .
As a consequence of Theorem 5 in combination with Lemma 6 , we obtain the following two corollaries that generalise the results to arbitrary bases for all four satisfiability problems.
Corollary 7. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions and SAT one of the problems TCSAT, OSAT and OCSAT.
If
Corollary 8. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions.
Part (1) generalises the EXPTIME-hardness of subsumption for FL 0 and AL with respect to GCIs [15, 11, 17] . It is in contrast to the tractability of subsumption with respect to GCIs in EL because our result does not separate the two types of restriction, because EL has only existential restriction, and our results do not (yet) consider existential, resp., universal restrictions separately. This undermines the observation that, for negation-free fragments, the choice of the quantifier affects tractability and not the choice between conjunction and disjunction. Again, DL-Lite cannot be put into this context because of the unqualified restrictions.
Parts (2)-(4) (resp. (2) and (3) for Corollary 8) show that satisfiability with respect to theories is already intractable for even smaller sets of Boolean operators. One reason is that sets of axioms already contain limited forms of implication and conjunction. This also causes the results of this analysis to differ from similar analyses for related logics in that hardness already holds for bases of clones that are comparatively low in Post's lattice.
Due to Post's lattice, our analysis is complete for dividing the fragments into tractable and intractable cases.
Proofs of the main results. Proof. The intepretation I = ({w}, · I ) with A I = ∅ for each atomic concept A, and r I = {(w, w)} for each role r satisfies any instance T for TSAT(B), where B contains only ⊥-reproducing functions. This follows from the observation that for each axiom A B in T both sides are always falsified by I (because every atomic concept is falsified, and we only have ⊥-reproducing operators as connectives). This can be shown by an easy induction on the concept structure. Please note that we need to construct a looping node concerning the transition relations due to the fact that we need to falsify axioms with ∀r.⊥ on the left side for some relation r. If we set r I = ∅ then this expression would be satisfied and would contradict our argumentation for the axiom ∀r.⊥ ⊥. Moreover this construction cannot fulfill wrongly the left side of an axiom because of the absence of and as no atomic concept has instances with w.
Lemma 11. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions with ∧ ∈ B, or ∨ ∈ B. Then TCSAT(B) is EXPTIME-hard. If all self-dual functions can be expressed in B, then TSAT(B) is EXPTIME-hard.
Proof. The cases ∧ ∈ B and ∨ ∈ B follow from [15] . The remaining case for the self-dual functions follows from Lemmas 1 and 2, as all self-dual functions in combination with the constants , ⊥ (to which we have access as ¬ is self-dual) can express any arbitrary Boolean function.
Lemma 12. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions s.t. {⊥, } ⊆ B. Then TSAT(B) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. To prove PSPACE-hardness, we state a ≤ cd -reduction from QBF-3-SAT to TSAT(B) and only allow ⊥ and as available functions in B. Let ϕ ≡ 1 x 1 2 x 2 · · · n x n (C 1 ∧· · ·∧C m ) be a quantified Boolean formula and i ∈ {∃, ∀}. In the following we construct a TBox T ⊆ Ax(B) s.t. ϕ ≡ if and only if T ∈ TSAT(B), where B consists only of and ⊥.
We are first adding the following axioms to the TBox T using atomic concepts d 0 , . . . , d n , x 1 , . . . , x n , x 1 , . . . , x n and roles R r , R 1 , . . . , R n , S, R x1 , . . . , R xn , R d1 , . . . , R dn , R C1 , . . . , R Cm , P 11 , P 21 , P 31 , . . . , P 1m , P 2m , P 3m . The atomic concepts d i stand for levels, x i and x i for assigning truth values to the variables.
Initial starting point:
x i is the negation of x i :
in each level d i we have R i+1 -successors where x i+1 and x i+1 hold:
the levels d i are disjoint and we have succeeding levels:
x i and x i carry over:
Now T is consistent, and each of its models contains a tree-like substructure similar to the one depicted in Figure 2 . The root of this substructure is an instance of d 0 . The individuals at depth n counting from the root are called leaves.
Please note that each individual in ∆ I is an instance of either x i or x i because of axiom (2) . In particular, this holds for the leaves. Furthermore, this enforcement does not contradict the level-based labeling of the x i -e.g., the atomic concepts x i and x i "labeled in d 0 " are not carried forward to the next levels because axiom (5) states this carry only if j > i.
In the remaining part, we need to ensure the following, where C j is an arbitrary clause in ϕ. Each leaf w is an instance of the atomic concept C j if and only if the combination of the x i -values in w satisfies the clause C j . In order to achieve this, we again use two complementary atomic propositions C j and C j . The C j must be enforced in all leaves where all literals of C j are set to false. For a literal ∈ {x 1 , x 1 , . . . , x n , x n }, use to denote the atomic concept x i if = x i and x i if = x i . The correct labeling of the leaves by the C j and C j is ensured by adding the following axioms to T , which enforce substructures as depicted for the example in Figure 1 :
{f ∃F. , f ∀F.⊥} ∪ (8) 
Finally we need to ensure that all concepts C j are true in the leaves depending on the quantifications 1 x 1 2 x 2 · · · n x n . For this purpose, we add the following axioms to the TBox T which ensure that, starting at the root, we run through each variable level of the tree as required by the quantification in ϕ, and reach only leaves that are no instances of f , i.e., that are instances of f :
Claim. ϕ ≡ iff T ∈ TSAT({ , ⊥}).
Proof. "⇐": Let I = (∆ I , · I ) be an interpretation s.t. I |= T . Due to axiom (1), there exists an individual w 0 that is an instance of d 0 . Because of axioms (3) and (4), there are at least two different R 1 -successors of d 0 , one being an instance of x 1 and the other of x 1 (axiom (5) in combination with axiom (4) ensure that these successors are fresh individuals). Every other R 1 -successor is an instance of either x 1 or x 1 , due to axiom (2). Other possible R j -edges for 2 ≤ j ≤ n will not affect our argumentation as we will see in the following.
Repeated application of axioms (3) and (4) shows that this structure becomes a complete binary tree of depth n with (at least) 2 n leaves. Each leaf represents one of all possible Boolean combinations of x i and x i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Due to axioms (3) and (4), every possible combination does occur. In addition, axiom (9) and (7) ensure the following: each leaf is an instance of either C j or C j , for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m; if a leaf is an instance of at least one such C j , it is also an instance of f . Axiom (10) allows us to conclude that all relevant leaves that represent the assignments θ i : {x 1 , . . . , x n } → {0, 1} for which θ i |= C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C m must hold, are instances of the proposition f . Additional R j -edges, as mentioned above, do not contradict the argumentation. Hence every relevant leaf must be an instance of every C j because otherwise it were an instance of C j and thus of f . Therefore, at least one literal in each clause is labeled and thereby satisfied. Hence ϕ ≡ .
Note that only those leaves that correspond to an assignment satisfying C j can be instances of C j . To clarify this fact, consider a clause C j = l 1j ∨ l 2j ∨ l 3j that is not satisfied by some assignment θ : {x 1 , . . . , x n } → { , ⊥}, and some leaf w is (erroneously) an instance of C j . As θ |= C j , it holds that θ |= l ij for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Thus l ij must be labeled in w in order for axiom (2) to be satisfied. Now axiom (6) enforces R 1j -and R 2j -edges to successors satisfying l 2j and l 3j . Finally, these propositions and transitions lead to w being an instance of C j . This is not possible because C j and C j are disjoint due to axiom (9) . "⇒": Let n be the number of variables in ϕ. In the following we show by induction on n:
Induction basis. n = 1. W.l.o.g., we assume that ϕ starts with ∃, i.e., ϕ = ∃x 1 (C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C m ) ≡ , and we assume that each C i contains the positive literal
We construct a model I = (∆ I , · I ) where we set ∆
Finally (f ) I = {w 2 } (the remaining labels are irrelevant). From this it can be easily verified that I |= T .
Induction step. Assume it holds for n ≥ 1. In the following we will show that the proposition holds for ϕ = ∃x 1 ∀x 2 · · · x n+1 F ≡ with F = (C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C m ). If ϕ starts with ∀, the argumentation is analogous. Let F [x 1 / ] (or F [x 1 /⊥]) denote the matrix F of ϕ with every occurrence of x 1 replaced by (or ⊥). Since ϕ ≡ , we have that
be the consistent terminology that is constructed out of χ 1 (this follows from our induction hypothesis). For each variable x i let C i = {C j | x i ∈ C j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and C i = {C j | x i ∈ C j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m} be the set of clauses that include the literal x i resp. x i . Let θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ k with θ i : {x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n+1 } → {0, 1} be the satisfying assignments generated by ∃x 2 ∀x 3 · · · x n+1 . As T χ1 is consistent, let I χ1 = (∆ Iχ 1 , · Iχ 1 ) be an interpretation s.t. I χ1 |= T χ1 . Hence it satisfies every axiom in T χ1 (that has the form of above) and in particular axiom (1) . Thus there is an individual w 0 ∈ ∆ Iχ 1 s.t. w 0 ∈ (d 0 ) Iχ 1 and therefore a binary tree is generated starting in w 0 (with the same argumentation as before). As that tree is defined over the variables x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n+1 , all leaves addressed by axiom (10) include C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C m , f , and for the transition relation R 2 it holds (R 2 )
In the next steps we will construct an interpretation I ϕ s.t. I ϕ |= T ϕ . ThereforeLemma 13. TSAT({¬}) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. From Lemma 2 we can simulate and ⊥ with fresh atomic concepts. Then the argumentation follows similarly to Lemma 12.
Lemma 14. TCSAT({⊥}) is coNP-hard.
Proof. In contrast to Lemma 12, the instances of TCSAT(I 0 ) consist of a concept C and a TBox T ⊆ Ax({⊥}). Both do not contain the concept . Now we adapt the proof of Lemma 12 to this new setting as follows: in all axioms containing , we replace with a fresh atomic concept t. This is unproblematic except for axiom (1), where we need to enforce d 0 to have an instance. For this purpose, we remove the axiom ∃S.d 0 from T and set C = d 0 . Additionally, we need to adopt axiom (10) to d 0 ∀R 1 .∀R 2 . · · · ∀R n .f to match the desired reduction from TAUT. Please note, that with this construction it is not possible to state a reduction from QBF-3-SAT, because an interpretation where whenever we want to branch existentially, a respective individual with neither x i nor x i labeled can be added without interfering the axioms, in particular axiom (2).
Conclusion
With Corollaries 7 and 8, we have separated the problems TSAT, TCSAT, OSAT and OCSAT for ALC fragments obtained by arbitrary sets of Boolean operators into tractable and intractable cases. We have shown that these problems are on the one hand for TSAT -EXPTIME-hard whenever we allow the constant in combination with at least conjunction or disjunction, -EXPTIME-hard whenever all Boolean self-dual functions can be expressed, -PSPACE-hard whenever we allow at least negation or both constants ⊥, , -trivial in all other cases.
On the other hand for the remaining three satisfiability problems we reached EXPTIME-hardness even for only disjunction or conjunction (without the constant ), and got coNP-hard cases whenever we allow at least the constant ⊥ (hence the ⊥-reproducing cases that are trivial for TSAT drop to intractable for these problems).
According to the Figures 4 and 5 , which arrange our results in Post's lattice, this classification covers all sets of Boolean operators closed under nesting.
We have also shown how our results, and the direct transfer of the results in [16] to concept satisfiability, generalise known results for the FL and EL family and other fragments of ALC. Furthermore, due to the presence of arbitrary axioms, the overall picture differs from similar analyses for related logics in that hardness already holds for small sets of inexpressive Boolean operators.
It remains for future work to find matching upper bounds for the hardness results, to look at fragments with only existential or universal restrictions, and to restrict the background theories to terminologies with atomic left-hand sides of concept inclusion axioms with and without cycles. Furthermore, since the standard reasoning tasks are not always interreducible if the set of Boolean operators is restricted, a similar classification for other decision problems such as concept subsumption is pending.
